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189 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 1999)
L Facts
On the evening of February 27, 1993, Michael Wayne Williams
("Williams") and Jeffrey Alan Cruse ("Cruse") procured a ride from Verena
Lozano James (James") to a rural area in Cumberland County with the
intention of robbing the Bear Creek Market. Finding it closed, Williams
told Cruse that he knew of a house where they could go to obtain a signifi-
cant amount of cash. Armed with a .357 caliber revolver, the two proceeded
to the home of Morris Keller and his wife, Mary. When Mr. Keller opened
the door, Willams pointed the gun at him and the two men entered. Wil-
liams commanded the Kellers to remove all of their clothing. Cruse search-
ed the house and found a fully-loaded .38 caliber pistol. Cruse returned to
the kitchen and, at Williams's suggestion, restrained the Kellers with phone
cord. Cruse placed the Kellers in a closet, and the two resumed searching
the house for valuables.'
Cruse then moved Mrs. Keller to a closet in the back bedroom. There,
Williams and Cruse raped her. The two then ordered the Kellers to shower
and dress, and told the couple that they were going for a walk. As they
were leaving, Williams told Mrs. Keller that he intended to burn down the
house and, at her request, escorted her back into the house to retrieve the
couple's marriage license.
Williams and Cruse took the Kellers down a road and into a thicket.
The two men agreed they would shoot the Kellers on the count of three.
On "three," Williams shot Mr. Keller, but Cruse did not shoot Mrs. Keller
until Williams turned to him and told him to do so. After Mrs. Keller fell
to the ground, Mr. Keller stood back up and Williams shot him once again.
Williams then shot the two victims several more times to ensure that they
were dead.3
Williams and Cruse returned to the Kellers' home, removed several
items, and placed them into the Kellers' Jeep Cherokee. They then burned
down the house. The following day, the two sold some of the goods and
1. Williams v. Taylor, 189 F.3d 421, 423-24 (4th Cir. 1999).
2. Id. at 424.
3. Id.
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threw the remaining property into a river. They then burned the Jeep
Cherokee."
When James learned of the fire, she notified police that she had left
Cruse and Williams near the scene. Police questioned Cruse, who was
initially uncooperative. Once the Kellers' bodies were found, Cruse con-
ferred with counsel and accepted a plea agreement under which the Com-
monwealth would not seek the death penalty in exchange for Cruse's
testimony. Cruse recounted his story without mentioning his participation
in Mrs. Keller's rape. When the Commonwealth became aware of Cruse's
omission, it rescinded the agreement and indicted him for capital murder.'
Williams was indicted, and a jury convicted him of capital murder and
recommended death. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed both the conviction and the death sentence. Williams filed a
habeas corpus petition in the Supreme Court of Virginia and moved for
discovery, an evidentiary hearing, and expert assistance. The court found
the motions meritless and dismissed them without explanation."
Williams then filed a federal habeas petition in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The court granted an
evidentiary hearing on three of Williams's claims and dismissed the others.
Realizing that Williams had filed his petition after the date that the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA")7 became
effective, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued
a stay and ordered the district court to reconsider its ruling. In light of
AEDPA, the district court denied Williams's request for an evidentiary
hearing and dismissed his remaining claims. Williams's appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit alleged that the district court
committed the following errors: (1) inappropriately applied 28 U.S.C. S
2254(e)(2) to his request for an evidentiary hearing;8 (2) improperly dis-
missed two claims that the Supreme Court of Virginia decided against
Williams on the merits, namely, that the Commonwealth withheld Cruse's
plea agreement in violation of Brady v. Maryland,' and violated his Sixth
Amendment right to be present and confront adverse witnesses at trial;"
(3)misinterpreted 21 U.S.C. S 848 (q)(9)1 by demanding that he show a need
of confidentiality to gain an ex parte hearing regarding the granting of
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 424-25.
7. Pub.L.No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (amending 28 U.S.C. Title 153).
8. Williams, 189 F.3d at 426.
9. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
10. Williams, 189 F.3d at 429. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
11. 21 U.S.C. S 848 (1996).
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expert assistance; 12 and (4) incorrectly required him to file his federal habeas
petition within 180 days of AEDPA's enactment date in accordance with 21
U.S.C. S 2263.13
IL Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's denial of Williams's petition for habeas corpus.14 The Fourth
Circuit found that Williams's request was governed by 28 U.S.C. 5
2254(e)(2) and that he failed to make the requisite statutory showing for an
evidentiary hearing."5 The court also held that the district court properly
denied Williams's other two claims. 16 Furthermore, the courit concluded the
district court correctly interpreted 21 U.S.C. S 848(q)(9) and properly
rejected Williams's request for expert assistance. 7 As to the time period in
which Williams filed his petition, the court found that any district court
error was harmless. 1i
II. Analysis/Application in Virginia9
A. Entitlement to an Evidentiary Hearing
Williams argued that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing in
district court in order to advance a number of claims."0 He also asserted that
28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(2) did not apply to his request for an evidentiary hear-
ing.2' In order for one's claim to escape review under 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e) (2),
one must diligently develop the factual basis of the claim in state court.2
12. Williams, 189 F.3d at 430.
13. Id. at 431. See 28 U.S.C. S 2263 (1996).
14. Williams, 189 F.3d at 431.
15. Id. at 426-27.
16. Id. at 427-31.
17. Id. at 430-31.
18. Id. at 431.
19. Because the Fourth Circuit summarily dismissed Williams's claim pertaining to
expert assistance, it will not be discussed in detail in this note. Williams challenged the
district court's determination that 21 U.S.C. S 848(q)( 9) required that he show a need for
confidentiality at an adversary hearing in order to obtain an ex parte hearing on the issue of
expert assistance. Id. Williams refused to participate in an adversary hearing and effectively
voided his request for expert assistance. Id. at 431. The Fourth Circuit found that S 848(q)(9)
expressly states Congress's intent to limit ex parte hearings absent a showing of a need for
confidentiality. Id. at 430-31. Accordingly, the court found that Williams did not establish
this need and consequently failed to show expert assistance was "reasonably necessary." Id.
at 431.
20. Id. at 425.
21. Id. at 426.
22. Id. (citing Cardwell v. Greene, 152 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 1998)).
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Specifically, such requests may not be vague or conclusory and must detail
a particularized need with respect to the claim. 3
In one claim, Williams alleged that during voir dire one of the jurors
falsely responded that she did not know any of the witnesses when she was,
in fact, formerly married to a deputy who testified for the Common-
wealth.2" Moreover, the prosecuting attorney had handled her divorce
Eproceedings some fifteen years earlier.
25 The court concluded that Wil-
liams's state habeas counsel had not exercised due diligence in obtaini*ng
information regarding the juror's divorce.26 The court opined that because
the divorce was a matter of public record, and federal counsel had located
the documents, state counsel had ample opportunity to learn of the
divorce. 7 In addition, the court found that general phrases in Williams's
request for investigative assistance were vague and failed to apprise the court
of a specific claim.2" Further, the court noted that Williams's state habeas
counsel failed to exercise diligence in locating a psychiatric evaluation in
Cruse's court file. 9
In' addition to proving diligence, 28 U.S.C. SS 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii)-(B)
require a defendant to establish that, but for the constitutional error, no
reasonable factfinder would have returned a guilty verdict.30 The court
concluded that even if Williams had diligently developed the requisite
factual basis, he would have been unable to show that no reasonable
factfinder would convict him of capital murder." The court found that the
medical examiner's testimony, Williams's own testimony that he shot Mr.
Keller and robbed the victims, along with the physical evidence implicating
him in the rape, were sufficient under Virginia law to convict Williams of
capital murder.2 The court went on to note that Williams would have been
equally unsuccessful at obtaining a hearing under pre-AEDPA law, which
required a showing of an external impediment to counsel's efforts as well as
23. i
24. Id. at 425.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 426.
27. Id.,
28. Id. The court identified the following phrases in Williams's petition as vague: (1)
"irregularities, improprieties and omissions" (referring to jury selection); and (2) "all circum-
stances relating to the empanelment of the jury and the jury's consideration of the case"
(describing the scope of the requested investigator's inquiry). Id.
29. Id. at 426-27.
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prejudice." The court found that none of Williams's claims met this stan-
dard. 4
Williams illustrates the demanding standards which must be met in
order to escape 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(2). Defense attorneys must meticulously
develop the factual basis of their state claims. The court's finding that
counsel should have consulted divorce records seems to indicate that the
Fourth Circuit expects a prodigious, and perhaps unreasonable, amount of
diligence. Furthermore, Williams reminds counsel of the importance of
creating case-specific, detailed, and imaginative motions in lieu of boiler-
plate requests which the court seems quick to reject.
B. Review of Claims Denied by the Supreme Court of Virginia
Williams argued that the district court erred in dismissing two of his
claims which the Supreme Court of Virginia had decided on the merits.3"
One claim involved allegations that the prosecutor withheld Cruse's infor-
mal plea agreement in violation of Brady v. Maryland.36 The other claim
asserted that the prosecution made an improper statement in violation of
Williams's Sixth Amendment right to be present at trial to confront adverse
witnesses.
37
The Fourth Circuit reviews such state court judgments under 28 U.S.C.
S 2254(d). This section disallows the issuance of federal habeas grants in
cases adjudicated on the merits except where the state court has made an
unreasonable factual determination or has unreasonably or contradictorily
applied federal law.38 Because the state court did not express its rationale for
denying Williams's habeas claim, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the state court
33. Id. at 427.
34. Id. at 427-28.
35. Id. at 428.
36. Id. at 428-29. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that the prosecu-
tion must disclose any exculpatory material in its possession to the defendant).
37. Id. at 429. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Williams, "you're the only
witness who sat here through this trial and heard the testimony of every witness before you
got to testify; isn't that correct?" Id.
38. Id. at 428. 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) reads:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a state court shal not be granted with respect to any
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim-
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of
ihe facts in the light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) (1996).
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record. 9 The Fourth Circuit was careful to note that review is deferential
and that a state court's decision will be affirmed so long as it is "minimally
consistent with the facts and circumstances of the case."'
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the state court's finding that Cruse had
no informal plea agreement at the time he testified against Williams.41 The
state court based its conclusion solely upon affidavits filed by the prosecutor
and Cruse's attorney avowing that no agreement existed.42 The Fourth
Circuit found that the affidavits, standing alone, supported the state court's
determination.43
In regard to Williams's Sixth Amendment claim, the Fourth Circuit
declined to decide whether there was error." The court reasoned that even
if error were established, Williams's inculpatory testimony was of such a
"devastating" nature as to have rendered the error harmless.4"
C Filing Deadlinefor the Federal Habeas Petition
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. S 2263, the district court required Williams to
file his federal habeas petition within 180 days of AEDPA's enactment
date.' Williams argued that 21 U.S.C. S 2263 applies only to "opt-in"
states47 and that Virginia is not one of them.4" Consequently, Williams
contended that he should have been afforded one year within AEDPA's
enactment date in which to file.49 The Fourth Circuit recognized that the
district court may have erred in applying 21 U.S.C. S 2263, but concluded
that any such error was harmless since Williams was not prejudiced by the
difference in time.' Virginia attorneys should recognize that the fact that
Virginia is not an "opt-in" state did not spare Williams from being required
to file his federal habeas petition within 180 days rather than one year.
39. Williams, 189 F.3d at 428.
40. Id. (citing Weeks v. Angelone, 176 F.3d 249, 259 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Hennan
v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 335 (4th Cir. 1997))).
41. Id. at 428-29.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 429.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 431.
47. "Opt-in" refers to those states that have met certain requirements relating to







On October 28, 1999, approximately one hour before Michael Wayne
Williams was scheduled to die by lethal injection, the United States Supreme
Court stayed his execution in order to consider the limits placed upon
federal courts to hold evidentiary hearings under AEDPA. s Williams is
among four Virginia death row inmates whose executions have been stayed
by the United States Supreme Court to date this year. 2
Latanya R. White
51. Frank Green, Williams'Execution Is Put Off, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Oct.
29, 1999, at Bi.
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